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Abstract 
7KH 613öV 6XVWDLQDEOH *URZWK &RPPLVVLRQ XSGDWHG DQ HFRQRPLF FDVH IRU 6FRWWLVK
independence, based on strong future economic growth over many years, however without any 
discussion of the many institutions that would be required for economic governance and 
oversight to help meet such enhanced growth. An independent Scotland would require a new 
set of regulatory bodies ó plus a system of appeals and sufficient democratic oversight by the 
Scottish Parliament. The Sustainable Growth Commission report draws heavily on the examples 
of Denmark, Finland and New Zealand whose models of economic governance and oversight 
vary considerably.  This article reviews the constraints and freedoms that an independent 
Scotland would face in developing its future competition policy and economic governance. 
Keywords: Scotland, Independence, Governance, Competition, European Union, Economic 
Governance. 
I Introduction 
The report of the Sustainable Growth Commission (2018) (SGC) to the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) proposed selecting and adapting economic policies and practices from small advanced 
QDWLRQV ķ SULQFLSDOO\ 'HQPDUN )LQODQG DQG 1HZ =HDODQG ķ WR GHOLYHU D GHFDGH RI HFRQRPLF
growth at 2.5 per cent annually, then fifteen years at 3.5 per cent annually. However, the report 
does not discuss whether there would be the necessary institutional capacity. One key area is 
competition policy, encompassing the regulation of markets in general (e.g., abuse of 
dominance and merger control) and of specific sectors (e.g., energy and telecommunications), 
plus oversight of state aid. The report is vague on the general governance of the economy, 
concerning the institutions that would be required to draft, consult upon, refine, and oversee 
implementation of the various policies, aside from two notable exceptions: the creation of a 
Scottish Central Bank (SCB) and Scottish Financial Authority (SFA). This paper reviews the 
constraints and freedoms that an independent Scotland would face in developing its future 
competition policy and economic governance.  
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The importance of institutions to economic growth was set out by North (1989), noting the 
importance of the ability to create institutions and the significance of path dependency. In Africa 
and Latin America, the lack of experience in the creation and maintenance of institutions 
hindered growth, in contrast to the successes of governments in the Asian tiger economies and 
China. The European Union has developed considerable capacity to devise institutions and to 
link them in governance networks, with regular revisions, arguably with excessive complexity. 
Whereas in the US, the pendulum swings between institutional development and efforts to roll 
it back. Current concerns focus on the types of institutions and policies need to regulate 
competition with two-sided and platform-based markets. 
Section II reviews issues around competition policy in an independent Scotland. Section III 
DQDO\VHVWKHHFRQRPLFJRYHUQDQFHRIWKH6*&öVWKUHHH[HPSODUFRXQWULHV6HFWLRQ,9H[DPLQHV
the options for economic governance and competition policy in an independent Scotland. In 
Section V, conclusions are drawn and issues identified for further research. 
II Competition policy 
The European Commission (EC) explains that: 
Competition policy cannot shape a fairer economy on its own, but it can make an 
important difference: enforcing competition law ensures that there is a voice for the 
consumers. Competition policy contributes towards a society that gives people 
choice, stimulates innovation, prevents abuses by dominant players, and drives 
companies to make the most of scarce resources thus contributing to addressing 
global challenges like climate change. (EC, 2017a) 
Competition policy has been a feature of the European project from the Treaty of Paris (1951), 
to the current Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 2007). The relevant articles 
address: 
 Antitrust and cartels; 
 Merger control; and 
 State aid control. 
 
The EC is a competition authority, promoting a competition culture and handling cases that have 
a European dimension, or relate to state aid (EC, 2018b), supplemented by the work of European 
regulatory networks (ERNs) (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2011). Competition experts from the member 
states (MSs) sit on an advisory committee that discusses draft EC decisions and some cases 
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being decided by national competition authorities (NCAs) (EC, 2003). The EC and the NCAs also 
cooperate through the European Competition Network (ECN), for example, publishing a report 
on online hotel bookings (EC, 2017b).  
Figure 1 State aid as a percentage of GDP (excluding railways) (EC, 2017c)   
 
 
MSs are required to have an independent NCA and a system of appeals, plus regulators for a 
number of economic sectors, each linked through ERNs, for example, for electricity. There is no 
standardised model; rather each MS has the freedom to design its own governance structures. 
For example, in Estonia the Konkurentsiamet combines the NCA and the regulation of all 
economic sectors, whereas a majority of MSs keep at least their competition authority separate. 
The United Kingdom has combined broadcasting, posts and telecommunications into a single 
body, the Office of Communications (OFCOM),1 SOXV D UDQJH RI RWKHU õRIILFHVö LH QRQ-
ministerial departments). In 2014, the United Kingdom merged the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
and Competition Commission to create the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).  
                                                     
1 OFCOM also has sectoral competition law powers. 
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State aid involves a company receiving government support that gives it an advantage over its 
competitors, consequently being prohibited under EU treaties, unless justified for economic 
development. Such exemptions are controlled by the EC and the ECJ to avoid distortions of the 
single market, reviewing funds to be provided by any level of government, from municipalities 
up to the European Investment Bank (EIB). The extent of state aid varies greatly (see Figure 1). 
Despite claims by the Labour Party that EU membership would constrain a putative UK Labour 
Government, it could, at least, double the level of state aid and remain within the framework. 
However, it would be more difficult to nationalise industries or to provide them with special 
status, given EU limits on golden shares and special rights (Putek, 2004; Werner, 2017).  
An independent Scotland would certainly become a member of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)2 observing its various recommendations, including its 
present economic strategy Going for growth (OECD, 2018). It would become a signatory to its 
various legal instruments, notably the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.3 Implementation of anti-corruption policies and 
treaties would require creation of a unit comparable to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).4 There 
has been concern about money laundering through limited partnerships registered in Scotland 
(Leask & Smith, 2018; BBC, 2018a). OECD membership includes participation in its many 
committees and working parties, effectively governance networks, discussing policy issues and 
measures to improve outcomes, including peer reviews. A Scottish NCA would be expected to 
participate in: 
 OECD Competition Committee (and its working parties); and  
 Global Forum on Competition. 
 
As an independent state, Scotland would have to adopt a framework for competition policy, 
indicating some level of intervention in the economy and to create institutions covering the role 
of the current UK regulators:  
 
                                                     
2 There is a complex legal argument over whether an independent Scotland must join or, as a successor state, it 
acquires some or all of the United Kingdom treaty obligations. 
3 Economic crimes would require the retention of the Bribery Act, with the capacity to enforce it, presently reliant on 
the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).  
4 Scotland would also be expected to ratify and implement the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the 
Criminal and Civil Conventions on Corruption of the Council of Europe, cooperating in the work of the Group of 
States against Corruption (GRECO). 
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 Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT); 
 United Kingdom Regulators Network; 
 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA); 
 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); 
 Payment Systems Regulator (PSR); 
 Office of Communications (OFCOM); 
 Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM); 
 Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT); 
 Office of Rail and Road (ORR); 
 Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO); and 
 Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 
 
The Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS) is the sole regulatory body that presently 
serves only Scotland, though some United Kingdom bodies have representative offices. While 
the Scottish courts can hear competition law cases, there has been remarkably little litigation 
before the Court of Session, partly because the geographical definition of markets is generally 
either the United Kingdom or Europe. The success of the CAT would favour the creation of a 
similar specialist tribunal in Scotland, from where cases could proceed to the Inner House of the 
Court of Session and, potentially, to a Scottish Supreme Court.  
Independence, in the sense of institutions rather than the state, is essential in economic 
regulation to protect decision-making from political interference, an issue avoided both by the 
SGC and by the SNP in its 2014 independence referendum campaign. Nonetheless, there are EU 
acquis obligations requiring the institutional independence of a number of agencies and widely 
accepted evidence that economic performance and the quality of governance are improved 
thereby (Gilardi, 2002; 2005; 2007; Guidi, 2015; Maggetti, 2009). A challenge faced by the EU 
has been to convince some accession countries of the benefits of making institutions genuinely 
distinct and separate from government, freeing their decision-making from ministerial influence, 
especially media regulators. In smaller countries, institutional  independence can be 
problematic, given that many individuals know each other from school, university, work or 
socially. 
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Regulatory capture is an extreme form of influence, in which agencies act for regulated firms 
rather than for citizens and the economy. To prevent this, measures to typically address include 
(Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Dal Bó, 2006; Hong & Kim, 2017): 
 Clarity of legal powers; 
 Appellate systems; 
 Collegiate boards with staggered renewal dates for commissioners; and  
 Delays on individuals taking up posts in regulated firms.5 
 
More challenging than the design of the future competition policy and institutions would be the 
transition from the current United Kingdom governance to a future Scottish governance. The 
simplest option would be to roll-over a list of relevant statutes and statutory instruments, adding 
ø6FRWWLVKùWRWKHQDPHVRIWKHFXUUHQWLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGOHJLVODWLRQWRDYRLGFRQIXVLRQDQGWR
begin recruiting qualified and experienced people for the various agencies. Licences could be 
VSOLW DW WKH ERUGHU õJUDQGIDWKHULQJö WKH H[LVWLQJ FRQGLWLRQV DQG PDGH VXEMHFW WR 6FRWWLVK
regulators and courts. However, this could not wait for independence, but would require 
agencies, licences, policies and parliamentary oversight arrangements to be operational much 
earlier. It would be necessary to draft legislation during a referendum campaign, so that in the 
event of a vote for independence, the Scottish Parliament could immediately be given the 
powers to scrutinise and enact essential legislation, in order that agencies could be brought into 
existence in good time. To ensure a smooth transition the agencies could then rent offices, 
recruit staff, develop computer systems, and begin to consult on their policies and on the 
DGDSWDWLRQRIOLFHQFHV$QDUHDRIFRQFHUQFRXOGEH6FRWODQGöVVmall market size, the sometimes 
challenging geography and low population density, which operators could claim justified higher 
retail or wholesale tariffs, to compensate for their inability to spread the costs over a larger 
population.6 The new agencies would have to create coordination mechanisms with each other 
and with their counterparts in the rest of the United Kingdom and the EU, notably where market 
definitions included both Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom or had a European 
dimension. 
The transition would require input from business users and consumers to the many 
consultations, activities that are presently concentrated in Brussels and London. This would be 
                                                     
5 7RDYRLGWKHõUHYROYLQJGRRUVöSUREOHP 
6 Presumably London-based regulators would try to reduce prices and tariffs for the same reason. 
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likely to require additional funding, training for existing organisations and the creation of new 
organisations. For example, Scottish Ministers have rarely published regulatory impact 
assessments (RIAs), which are commonly used by regulators in their consultations, requiring 
sufficient understanding by parties planning to respond. Good governance relies on informed 
responses to consultations and periodic appeals to the courts, which require engagement, 
funding, and skills.  
In addition to the headline agencies, there is a wide range of other bodies presently involved in 
market governance. For example, Table 1 shows the array of bodies in and around the 
telecommunications sector, the functions of which, if not their structures would have to be 
replicated. 
The issues of competition and regulatory policy in an independent Scotland are unavoidable. 
They are not especially contentious, since in the first instance they would entail rolling over 
existing UK institutions and policies, making only essential changes and then organising regular 
reviews of laws, policies and institutions.  The metagovernance priority would be to ensure a 
smooth transition and parliamentary oversight of institutions. 
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Table 1  UK regulatory institutions in the ICT sector (Sutherland, 2017)  
Name Status Functions 
Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA)  
Independent 
Regulator of advertising across all media, including marketing on 
websites 
Competition and Markets 
Authority  
Non-ministerial 
department 
The CMA is the UK national competition authority (e.g., merger 
control). Handles some appeals from OFCOM 
Office of Communications 
(OFCOM)  
Non-ministerial 
GHSDUWPHQWü 
OFCOM is sector and competition law regulator for broadcasting, 
posts, and telecommunications 
Communications and Internet 
Services Adjudication Scheme  Independent* 
CISAS provides customers of communications companies (e.g., 
telephone and broadband) with free, independent dispute 
resolution 
Ombudsman Services ó 
Communications 
Independent* 
Resolves complaints from consumers about phone and broadband 
companies 
Telephone Preference Service 
(TPS)  
Independent* 
An opt-out service for customers wishing not receive to unsolicited 
sales or marketing calls 
Office of Telecommunication 
Adjudicator (OTA2) 
Independent* 
Oversees co-operation between communications providers and 
enables a competitive environment 
Broadband Stakeholder Group ,QGHSHQGHQWü 8.JRYHUQPHQWöVDGYLVRU\IRUXPIRUWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV 
Network Interoperability (NICC)  
Independent 
Technical forum that develops interoperability standards for public 
communications networks and services 
Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT)  Judicial 
Specialist judicial body with expertise in law, economics, business 
and accountancy, that hears and decides cases involving 
competition or economic regulatory issues 
General Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ)  Government 
department 
Works with other intelligence agencies, other departments, law 
enforcement and industry to defend government systems from 
cyber threats and strives to keep the public safe, in real life and 
online. 
National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC) Part of GCHQ 
Helps protect critical services, managing major incidents and 
improving the security of the UK Internet through technology and 
advice to citizens and organisations 
Interception of 
Communications 
&RPPLVVLRQHUöV2IILFH,2&&2 
Non-ministerial 
department 
Reviews the interception of communications and the acquisition 
and disclosure of communications data by intelligence agencies, 
police forces and other public authorities 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
(IPT)  Judicial 
Investigates & determines complaints alleging that public 
authorities or law enforcement agencies have unlawfully used 
covert techniques and infringed our right to privacy 
Gambling Commission  Non-departmental 
SXEOLFERG\ü 
Regulates commercial gambling and the National Lottery 
,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHUöV
Office (ICO)  
Independent 
Upholds information rights in the public interest, promoting 
openness by public bodies and data privacy for individuals 
Internet Watch Foundation 
(IWF) 
Independent 
Maintains UK hotline for reporting criminal online content 
UK Council for Child Internet 
Safety (UKCCIS) 
Government led 
body 
A group of more than 200 organisations including government, 
industry, law, academia and charity sectors that works to help keep 
children safe online 
UK Safer Internet Centre  
Partnership 
SWGfL, Childnet International and IWF - promoting the safe and 
responsible use of technology for young people 
Child Exploitation and Online 
Protection Centre (CEOP) 
Police 
Dedicated to eradicating the sexual abuse of children 
* Approved by OFCOM 
üVSRQVRUHGE\WKH'HSDUWPHQWIRU'LJLWDO&XOWXUH0HGLDDQG6SRUW'&06 
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III  Regulatory landscapes in three small nations 
The SGC drew on experiences from three advanced small states: 
x Denmark; 
x Finland; and  
x New Zealand  
 
The first two are EU member states which helped produce and are in full compliance with the 
EU acquis, and are deeply embedded in EU institutions. While Finland is in the Eurozone, the 
'DQLVK.URQDLVRQO\SHJJHGWRWKH(XUR%RWKIROORZWKHõ1RUGLFPRGHOö, being small, open 
economies delivering stable and sustainable growth, with ambitious welfare systems and 
comprehensive public sectors financed by high taxes. New Zealand is quite different being a 
group of rather remote Pacific islands that was formerly in the British Empire. 
 
Table 2  Demark, Finland, New Zealand and the UK compared  
Indicator Units Denmark Finland 
New 
Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
Population  millions 5.8 5.5 4.8 66.6 
Population density per km2 136 16 18 276 
Life expectancy years 79.5 81.0 81.3 81.8 
GDP per capita (current prices) USD 53,730 43,339 40,233 40,249 
Real GDP growth % pa 2.0 2.6 3.1 1.4 
Government revenue % of GDP 53.1 54.4 39.2 38.0 
GINI co-efficient score 28.2 27.1 - 33.2 
Doing Business rank 3 11 1 7 
FDI ó Net inflows  USD millions -2,266 10,851 3,237 64,685 
FDI ó Net outflows USD millions 13,309 11,155 486 147,078 
Human Development Index  
score 0.929 0.920 0.917 0.922 
rank 11th 15th 16th 14th 
Sources: CIA, IMF, OECD, UNDP and World Bank  
 
The three differ greatly in their economic, physical and political geographies (see Table 2); 
Denmark has a much higher population density, while New Zealand has markedly lower 
government revenues and taxes. Picking elements of their competition, economic and regulatory 
policies would require very detailed analysis, identifying particular circumstances and path 
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dependencies, then judicious adaptation. Figure 2 shows the GDP growth of the three, together 
with that of the United Kingdom, while Figure 3 shows GDP per capita, neither of which suggests 
that the three smaller nations have outperformed the United Kingdom to any significant extent. 
Figure 2  Real GDP annual growth (IMF, 2018a) 
 
 
Figure 3  GDP per capita, current prices PPP USD (IMF, 2018b 
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(i) Demark  
Denmark is a member of networks of competition authorities in the Nordic region, EU and OECD. 
It is also a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which analyses its policies 
DQQXDOO\ REVHUYLQJ WKDW ø&RPSHWLWLRQ LQ WKH VHUYLFHV VHFWRU FRuld be improved further by 
enhancing the powers of the Competition Council in relation to companies breaching regulations 
DQGH[SORLWLQJWKHLUGRPLQDQWPDUNHWSRVLWLRQù,0)F,WVFRPSHWLWLRQSROLF\KDVEHHQ
peer reviewed by OECD countries (OECD, 2015). Its government established a Productivity 
Commission (Produktivitetskommissionen, 2014) that identified steps to be taken to improve 
productivity that had been lagging other economies, especially larger economies. 
In 2010, the Danish Competition Authority and the Danish Consumer Agency (itself the result of 
a previous merger of the Danish Consumer Complaints Board and the Danish Consumer 
Ombudsman) were merged to become the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA), 
activities which the government argued were closely related. Unusually, the DCCA lies within the 
Ministry of Business and Growth, rather than being an independent executive agency. In matters 
of the enforcement of the Competition Act, the Competition Council and the DCCA are 
independent of the minister. However, enforcement of the Competition Act is split between the 
DCCA and the public prosecutor, only the latter can initiate prosecutions for the imposition of 
fines. Legislative amendments from 2015 provided greater independence from the Ministry and 
a more streamlined and expert Competition Council, its decision-making body. 
(ii) Finland 
Finland is also a member of the networks of the IMF, EU, OECD, and Nordic countries, with the 
corresponding analyses, reports and statistics. Its economy is presently considered to be 
performing well:  
Robust output growth is projected on the back of a rebound in exports and continued 
strength in domestic demand. Private consumption will keep growing steadily in 
2018, thanks to a rise in earnings and employment. (OECD, 2018, p. 139) 
In the second half of the 20th century, economic and social development of Finland was a 
success, the result of continuous investment in education, research and innovation, enabling 
the transition from a largely resource-based to a knowledge-based economy, adopting high-
technology manufacturing and knowledge-based services. However, it was hit hard by the 2007 
global financial crisis and by technological disruptions that almost destroyed the mobile 
handset business of Nokia (Doz & Wilson, 2017), leading to a sharp drop in ICT exports and 
 Economic Commentary, December 2018 
business enterprise R&D (BERD). It also lost ground in terms of productivity and 
competitiveness. Nonetheless, Finland retains substantial innovation capabilities and is 
considered able to diversify from the relatively narrow range of industries in which it has enjoyed 
comparative advantage. A review of innovation policy suggested strengthening the focus and 
level of spending both on established industries and on building new export strengths (OECD, 
2017). 
In 2013, the Finnish Competition Authority and Finnish Consumer Agency were merged to form 
the Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirastosta (KKV, 2018) or Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority. 
The EC noted it had increased competition in services, in response to its country-specific 
recommendation (EC, 2018c). A peer review found regulatory agencies had limited 
independence, reporting to and being closely tied to parent ministries, unlike many other EU 
countries (OECD, 2010). Reforms to the constitution had strengthened the role of parliament in 
public governance and enhanced the role of the courts. A previous review noted the need to 
continue to improve the regulatory framework and reduce the administrative burden to increase 
competition in services and to promote investment (OECD, 2003).  
(iii) New Zealand  
Geographically, New Zealand is remote. Entry into its market is more difficult than is the case in 
Demark or Finland, since it is not part of a larger single market and there are few ways for 
businesses to share costs with operations in its neighbours, such as Australia, Chile, Hawaii or 
the Pacific island states. Politically, it has undergone major policy innovations, enabled by first-
past-the-post rather than proportional voting system combined with its unicameral parliament 
that allows governments an unusually free hand to effect change. In 1984 New Zealand:  
þHPEDUNHG RQ ZKDW HYROYHG LQWo one of the most comprehensive programs of 
economic reform of any OECD country in recent decades (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, 
& Teece, 1996, p. 1860).  
Government departments that provided services were converted into state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), many were privatised, stripped of any provision of policy advice and the administration 
of government programmes. Industry and competition policies focused on developing a 
competitive environment, with markets determining commercial outcomes, without support for 
any economic sector (Bridgman & Barry, 2002). What had been one of the most interventionist 
of the OECD economies became one of the most open and market-based. Under the Commerce 
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Act of 1986, competition policy aimed to minimise governmental and regulatory interventions, 
relying instead on actual and potential competition to regulate prices and monopoly behaviour. 
New Zealand has a productivity problem, partly attributed to firms not learning from global 
leaders in their sectors, the weak diffusion of technology and the survival of poorer performing 
firms in the absence of market entry due to geographic isolation (Conway, 2018). Firms generally 
have weak international connections and do not participate in global value chains (GVCs), while 
there is limited inward and low outward FDI. As much as 40 per cent of the productivity gap 
compared with the OECD average reflected weak investment in knowledge-based assets (Serres, 
Yashiro, & Boulhol, 2014). Its economic growth has been achieved by increased participation in 
the workforce. 
(iv) All three country examples considered 
The three examples highlight the complexities of path dependencies, institutional histories, and 
political constraints that influence regulatory design and practice. At one extreme lies New 
Zealand, with its low taxation and avoidance of state aid, made possible by its unicameral 
majoritarianism, while Denmark and Finland are tied into multi-level governance networks of the 
Nordic states and the EU. While these limit their freedom to innovate or differentiate in policies, 
they also provide reinforcement for the advocacy of pro-competitive policies and practices.  It is 
likely that an independent Scotland would lie somewhat closer to that of Denmark and Finland 
than to New Zealand though if it remained a unicameral parliament it would have the potential 
for quite rapid change.   
IV Good governance in an independent Scotland 
The SGC had little to say about governance or the design of institutions and systems. Insofar as 
it described policy-making and implementation in its hypothetical independent Scotland it was 
as a collective process, in which many parties would be subject to Gramscian co-optation to 
arrive at a broad consensus (Cox, 1983). While there would be yet more non-departmental public 
bodies (NDPBs) to advise government, there was no discussion of the scrutiny of their creation, 
appointment of officials, processes or outputs, or the roles that might be played by citizen juries, 
media, or town hall meetings. Nor was the issue of judicial review in the Court of Session 
addressed nor a possible supreme court, though this would surely become more frequent, 
requiring the applicable criteria to be weighed carefully (Auburn, Moffett, & Sharland, 2013; 
Knight, 2018). The emphasis was on answers, rather than on discussing the creation of high 
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quality institutions and processes that would ensure the long-term decision-making needed to 
maintain rapid growth. 
The Scottish Parliament 
Perhaps the most critical issue of all is the role of the Scottish Parliament, which would 
undoubtedly have a major role in the negotiations for and transition to independence, then a 
continuing role to ensure accountability and transparency of government and agencies, with its 
members in turn being held accountable in elections. Independence would greatly increase the 
powers of Scottish Ministers and, presumably, their numbers, requiring a comparable increase 
in the range of committees and the time for questioning ministers in the Scottish Parliament. 
The present arrangements for committees reflect an ever-changing and ephemeral composition 
of ministerial portfolios, which limits the capacity of committee members to develop subject 
expertise and thus reduces their effectiveness (Arter, 2004; Cairney, 2006; Halpin, MacLeod, & 
McLaverty, 2012). Minimally, there would need to be more committees to oversee additional 
ministers and agencies, ideally with portfROLRVGHFLGHGE\WKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWķUDWKHUWKDQ
WKH)LUVW0LQLVWHUķDQGZLWKHOHFWHGUDWKHUWKDQDSSRLQWHGFRQYHQRUV7KHFRPPLWWHHVQHHGWR
be reinforced with more staff and the hiring of more experts to support specific studies. In 
addition, the issue of conflicts of interest would have to be explicitly addressed. 
A second chamber? 
An argument could be made for a second or deliberative chamber, representing the diverse 
geography of Scotland, comparable to the German Bundesrat or the US Senate. (Diermeier & 
Myerson, 1999; Rogers, 2003; Benz, 2018).  However, the three small countries referenced in 
the SGC report all have unicameral legislatures. The challenges would be decide if and how to 
create a second chamber or senate, a body better able to deliberate and to take a longer term 
and wider geographic view of legislation and policies.  It would be vastly smaller and more 
democratic than the House of Lords, but perform similar functions. 
Think Tanks 
A further gap is in the capacity of think tanks and similar organisations, which have typically 
been located in London and in Brussels. While these have grown over the years of devolution, 
they would need to be boosted in capacity, geographic coverage and numbers, while ensuring 
they remained independent. The value of critical voices should not be understated.  
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Mergers 
At present, the acquisition of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) is handled 
by The Takeover Panel using its code, an arrangement that would presumably continue.7 These 
arrangements would seem likely to remain in place. A somewhat similar arrangement applies 
with the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) with its codes, though logically this should be 
replicated. It could be argued that such governance activities ought to be brought under a 
statutory agency directly responsible to the Scottish Parliament.  
Press regulation 
A contentious area of regulation would be the press, where there are no easy solutions and 
regulation is presently asymmetric with broadcasting and the Internet. By Royal Charter, HMG 
created a meta-regulator, the Press Recognition Panel (PRP), to determine whether press 
regulators meet the criteria recommended by the Leveson Inquiry. There are two regulators, the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) covering most national newspapers, and 
IMPRESS for a smaller number of outlets, only the latter has been recognised by the PRP. In 
addition to questions about the form of media regulation, a question arises about the Privy 
Council, which approves Royal Charters, not only for the PRP but also for universities and many 
other bodies. The Scottish Privy Council has apparently not met since 1706 and its revival could 
be considered anachronistic, opening the question of more modern processes and 
organisations. 
Infrastructure: housing and transport 
The high levels of economic growth call from continuous work on building houses and 
infrastructure. This would need to avoid unnecessary blockages of NIMBY-ism, such as 
opposition to the construction of new housing, railways and roads. Clearly, there are lessons to 
be learned from careful analysis of the failures of the Edinburgh tram scheme, the delays in the 
Network Rail electrification of the Edinburgh-Glasgow rail link and the interminable discussions 
of a rail link to Glasgow Airport. 
The digital economy and data protection 
Given the importance assigned to digitalisation of the economy in the SGC report and talk of a 
õ)RXUWKLQGXVWULDOHYROXWLRQö4IR), data protection would be critical. The present framework is 
                                                     
7 http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/ 
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the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679,8 transposed as the Data Protection 
Act 2018,9 HQIRUFHGE\WKH,QIRUPDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQHUöV2IILFH,&2LQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPZLWK
coordination through the European Data Protection Board (EDPB).10 Brexit takes the ICO out of 
the EDPB and removes from citizens the unique protection of Article 8 of the European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, a unique right to data protection.11 The EU combination of laws 
and institutions represents the highest level of data protection. Independence would require 
Scotland to replicate the ICO, the Data Protection Act 2018, and, if an EU MS, to sign up to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Scottish ICO would have to ensure organisations complied with 
the GDPR.  
Rather than try to answer questions definitively, it would have been useful had the SGC 
recognised the importance of the systems that would be used to govern the economy of its 
independent Scotland. Delivery of high levels of growth and of improved productivity would 
require the development of institutions fitted to the communities of interest in Scotland.  
V Conclusions 
The report by the Sustainable Growth Commission gives insufficient weight to the importance of 
metagovernance for a democratic society. The very high targets for growth necessitate careful 
formulation of economic policies, detailed planning, thoughtful implementation and scrupulous 
oversight, rather than calling for everyone to put their shoulders to the wheel in some kind of 
Stakhanovite endeavour. The design of institutions and processes, must aim for systems that 
achieve and maintain high levels of growth, and ensure equally high levels of accountability and 
transparency. It would be necessary to avoid problems of economic overheating, by pre-
emptively addressing bottlenecks, such as in the supply of skilled labour, housing and 
transport, requiring coordination across a wide range of government directorates and agencies, 
some of them newly created, at a time of considerable disruption. Overheating could increase 
inflation, putting pressure on a future Scottish Central Bank, which itself would be constrained 
E\WKH6*&öVFKRLFHRIVWHUOLQJLVDWLRQ 
A key omission is any discussion of the role the Scottish Parliament, creating massive gaps in 
oversight and a potentially large democratic deficit, at a time when Scotland would need to 
                                                     
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 
9 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/contents 
10 Formerly the Article 29 Working Party. 
11 Other treaties are limited to privacy, from which data protection has to be inferred. 
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overcome deep divisions. Parliamentary scrutiny would require a substantially strengthened set 
of committees with functional specialisations to hold ministers, officials and the burgeoning 
agencies to account. This would be true in the medium term, but also in the short term, 
especially in overseeing the transition to independence and scrutinising the voluminous 
legislation. Independence necessitates new structures, new processes and, potentially, a 
second chamber to UHIOHFW6FRWODQGöVgeographical diversity and to enhance deliberation and 
scrutiny. Equally, a new constitutional or supreme court might be needed. 
Aside from banking, there is a need to discuss the institutions that would be required in a 
putatively independent Scotland. One answer is to simply replicate or roll over existing UK laws 
and institutions ó and this could be a short term response to not scare the horses.  However, 
further consideration is needed of how such institutions would be created, and (crucially) be 
made independent of Scottish Ministers. It raises the medium term question of how coalitions 
of interest might wish to shape those institutions in ways different from today ó towards a co-
ordinated market economy (CME) or a liberal market economy (LME) and, more importantly, how 
is that to be decided?  
If nothing else has been learned from Brexit, it is the importance of customs agreements in a 
globalised economy. Given centuries of integration in a customs union with England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, the negotiation of a replacement agreement between an independent Scotland 
and rUK would seem likely to be difficult, especially if Brexit had gone wrong. The omission of 
the difficulties of negotiations and the likely economic costs of the different scenarios needs to 
remedied 
Having lived through Brexit, it is unstainable to now simply ignore the potentially difficult 
transition from the present day institutions and policies of the United Kingdom to those of an 
independent Scotland. Unsuccessful management of any transition could result in the loss of 
firms and the consolidation of markets in ways that would diminish growth, hurt consumers, 
constrain wages and limit future options. Companies presently engage with and understand the 
rules of the United Kingdom, admittedly confused by the very significant uncertainties of various 
øKDUGQHVVHVùRI%UH[LW7KH\ZRXOGKDYHWROHDUQDERXWWKHQHZLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSROLFLHVRIDQ
independent Scotland, and create new capacity for lobbying and litigation. Some firms might 
view this as unwelcome, with additional costs and the need to coordinate with their United 
Kingdom activities, consequently preferring to sell to a local firm or individuals with greater 
expertisHLQDQGNQRZOHGJHRI6FRWODQGöVFRXUWVSROLWLFVSXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGUHJXODWLRQV 
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None of the institutional requirements is especially difficult, given sufficient planning, nor need 
they be contentious. It would be possible to expand some existing institutions, while replicating 
United Kingdom models for others, in some cases building on their limited operations in 
Scotland. In time, it would be appropriate to conduct reviews and to revise the structures, 
requiring formal mechanisms, perhaps aided by the proposed Productivity Commission. It would 
also be necessary to be ready to take part in - and learn from - international governance networks 
such as the OECD and, perhaps, the EU. In the area of competition policy, it would be essential 
to establish relationships with the pre-existing bodies in the United Kingdom, in order to be able 
to consider jointly mergers and cross-border issues, such as physical distribution and transport. 
Denying the administrative challenges in creating institutions and cross-border arrangements 
would be to repeat the grave errors of the Brexiteers.  
None of the issues are insurmountable, indeed many may not be.  However, in any future 
prospectus for an independent Scotland ó especially given the painful UK and Scottish 
experience of Brexit ó it is vital that issues of economic governance, including competition 
policy, are addressed to ensure a smooth and successful transition to a high growth  
independent Scotland.   
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